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We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be
hard in a variety of voting rules. We put forward eﬃcient algorithms for the problem in
Borda, Maximin and Plurality with Runoff, and analyze their windows of error. Speciﬁcally,
given an instance on which an algorithm fails, we bound the additional power the
manipulators need in order to succeed. We ﬁnally discuss the implications of our results
with respect to the popular approach of employing computational hardness to preclude
manipulation.
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1. Introduction
Social choice theory is an extremely well-studied subﬁeld of economics. In recent years, interest in the computational
aspects of social choice, and in particular in the computational aspects of voting, has sharply increased.
In an election, a set of voters submit their (linear) preferences (i.e., rankings) over a set of candidates. The winner of
the election is designated by a voting rule, which is basically a mapping from the space of possible preference proﬁles into
candidates. A thorn in the side of social choice theory is formulated in the famous Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem [15,26].
This theorem essentially states that for any voting rule that is not a dictatorship, there are elections in which at least one
of the voters would beneﬁt by lying. A dictatorship is a voting rule where one of the voters—the dictator—single-handedly
decides the outcome of the election.
Since the 1970s, when this impossibility result was established, an enormous amount of effort has been invested in
discovering ways to circumvent it. Two prominent and well-established ways are allowing payments [4,16,29], or restricting
the voters’ preferences [20].
In this paper, we wish to discuss a third path—the “path less taken”, if you will—which has been explored by computer
scientists. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem implies that in theory, voters are able to manipulate elections, i.e., bend them
to their advantage by lying. But in practice, deciding which lie to employ may prove to be a hard computational problem;
after all, there are a superpolynomial number of possibilities of ranking the candidates.
✩ A signiﬁcantly shorter version of this paper (with most of the proofs omitted) appeared in the Proceedings of the Nineteenth ACM–SIAM Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms (SODA-08). This work was also presented at the Dagstuhl Workshop on Computational Issues in Social Choice, October 2007.
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Bartholdi and Orlin [2] greatly strengthened the approach by proving that the important Single Transferable Vote (STV) rule
is hard to manipulate.
This line of research has enjoyed new life in recent years thanks to the inﬂuential work of Conitzer, Sandholm, and
Lang [7].3 The foregoing paper studied the complexity of coalitional manipulation. In this setting, there is a coalition of
potentially untruthful voters, attempting to coordinate their ballots so as to get their favorite candidate elected. The authors
further assume that the votes are weighted: some voters have more power than others. Conitzer et al. show that in a
variety of prominent voting rules, coalitional manipulation is NP-hard, even if there are only a constant number of candidates
(for more details, see Section 2). This work has been extended in numerous directions, by different authors [5,8,12,18,25];
Elkind and Lipmaa [9], for example, strengthened the abovementioned results about coalitional manipulation by employing
cryptographic techniques.
In short, computational complexity is by now a well-established method of circumventing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
Theorem. Unfortunately, a shortcoming of the results we mentioned above is that they are worst-case hardness results,
and thus provide a poor obstacle against potential manipulators. Recent work regarding the frequency of manipulation has
argued that with many worst-case hard-to-manipulate voting rules, a potential manipulator may be able to compute a
manipulation in typical settings [6,13]. In particular, Procaccia and Rosenschein [23,24] have established some theoretical
results regarding the frequency of success of an algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem. The matter was further
discussed by Erdélyi et al. [11]. In spite of this, the question of the tractability of the manipulation problem, and in particular
of the coalitional manipulation problem, in typical settings is still wide-open.
Our approach and results We wish to convince the reader that, indeed, the coalitional manipulation problem can be eﬃ-
ciently solved in typical settings under some prominent voting rules, but our approach differs from all previous work. We
present eﬃcient heuristic algorithms for the problem that provide theoretical guarantees. Indeed, we characterize small
windows of instances on which our algorithms may fail; the algorithms are proven to succeed on all other instances.
Speciﬁcally, we prove the following results regarding three of the most prominent voting rules (in which coalitional
manipulation is known to be NP-hard even for a constant number of candidates):
Theorem.
1. In the Borda rule, if there exists a manipulation for an instance with certain weights, Algorithm 2will succeed when given an extra
manipulator with maximal weight.
2. In the Plurality with Runoff rule, if there exists a manipulation for an instance with certain weights, Algorithm 3will succeed when
given an extra manipulator with maximal weight.
3. In the Maximin rule, if there exists a manipulation for an instance with certain weights, Algorithm 1 will succeed when given two
copies of the set of manipulators.
Signiﬁcance in Artiﬁcial Intelligence The sharply increased interest in computational aspects of voting is motivated by numer-
ous applications of voting techniques and paradigms to problems in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI). These applications include
work in AI subﬁelds as diverse as Planning [10], Automated Scheduling [17], Recommender Systems [14], Collaborative Fil-
tering [22], Information Extraction [27], and Computational Linguistics [21].
Unfortunately, in the application of voting to AI, some of the problems investigated in Social Choice Theory, and in par-
ticular the issue of manipulation, become especially acute. Indeed, multiagent systems are often inhabited by heterogeneous,
self-interested agents. Such agents, unlike human beings, can be designed to be rational, and constantly engaged in com-
putations meant to increase their utility. In particular, a self-interested agent could seize the opportunity to manipulate an
election to its beneﬁt if such an opportunity were computationally easy to recognize (unless speciﬁcally programmed not
to).
The agenda of circumventing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem via computational complexity is, once again, most
relevant and compelling when the voters are software agents that populate a multiagent system, since the effective, bounded
rationality of such agents is practically governed by the laws of computational complexity. This is why the agenda has
become a prominent one in AI, with numerous papers on the subject published in the major AI conferences over the last
ﬁve years. As of yet, there are few papers on frequency of manipulation, rather than on its worst-case complexity. We feel
that this line of work on frequency of manipulation may inﬂuence the entire direction of the computational social choice
research agenda (see Section 5 for more details regarding work on frequency of manipulation).
Structure of the article In Section 2 we describe the major voting rules and formulate the coalitional manipulation problem.
In Section 3 we present and analyze our algorithms in three subsections: Borda, Plurality with Runoff, and Maximin. We
provide some results regarding an unweighted setting in Section 4. In Section 5 we describe related work at length. Finally,
we discuss our approach in Section 6.
3 Historical note: although we cite the JACM 2007 paper, this work originated in a AAAI 2002 paper.
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An election consists of a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of candidates and a set S = {v1, . . . , v |S|} of voters. Each voter provides a
total order on the candidates. To put it differently, each voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The voting setting also
includes a voting rule, which is a function from the set of all possible combinations of votes to C .
We shall discuss the following voting rules (whenever the voting rule is based on scores, the candidate with the highest
score wins):
• Scoring rules. Let α = 〈α1, . . . ,αm〉 be a vector of non-negative integers such that α1  α2  · · ·  αm . For each voter,
a candidate receives α1 points if it is ranked ﬁrst by the voter, α2 if it is ranked second, etc. The score of a candidate
is the total number of points the candidate receives. The scoring rules that we will consider are: Borda, where α =
〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,0〉; Veto, where α = 〈1,1, . . . ,1,0〉; and Plurality, where α = 〈1,0, . . . ,0〉.
• Maximin. For any two distinct candidates x and y, let N(x, y) be the number of voters who prefer x to y. The maximin
score of x is σ(x) =miny =x N(x, y).
• Copeland. For any two distinct candidates x and y, let C(x, y) = +1 if N(x, y) > N(y, x) (in this case we say that x beats
y in their pairwise election), C(x, y) = 0 if N(x, y) = N(y, x), and C(x, y) = −1 if N(x, y) < N(y, x). The Copeland score of
candidate x is σ(x) =∑y =x C(x, y).• Plurality with Runoff. In this rule, a ﬁrst round eliminates all candidates except the two with the highest plurality scores.
The second round determines the winner between these two by their pairwise election.
In some settings the voters are weighted. A weight function is a mapping w : S →N. When voters are weighted, the above
rules are applied by considering a voter of weight l to be l different voters.
Deﬁnition 2.1.
1. In the Constructive Coalitional Weighted Manipulation (CCWM) problem in a voting rule F , we are given a set C of
candidates, with a distinguished candidate p ∈ C , a set of weighted voters S that already cast their votes (these are the
truthful voters), and a list of weights W for a set of voters T that still have not cast their votes (the manipulators). We
are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T such that p wins the election under the voting rule F .
2. Constructive Coalitional Unweighted Manipulation (CCUM) problem is a special case of CCWM problem where all
the weights equal 1.
Remark 2.2. We implicitly assume in both questions that the manipulators have full knowledge about the other votes.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we also assume that ties are broken adversarially to the manipulators, so if p ties with
another candidate, p loses. The latter assumption is equivalent to formulating the manipulation problems in their unique
winner version, when one assumes that all candidates with maximal score win, but asks that p be the only winner.
Theorem 2.3. (See [7].) The CCWM problem in Borda, Veto, Maximin, Copeland, and Plurality with Runoff isNP-complete, even when
the number of candidates is constant.
Throughout this paper we will use the convention that |C | =m, |S| = N and |T | = n. Whenever the voting rule is based
on scores, we will denote by σS, j(c) the accumulated score of candidate c from the voters in S and the ﬁrst j voters of T
(ﬁxing some order on the voters of T ). Whenever it is clear from the context that S is ﬁxed, we will use simply σ j(c) for
the same. Also, for G ⊆ C,0 j  n we will write σ j(G) = {σ j(g) | g ∈ G}. For two lists A, B (ordered multisets), we denote
by A + B the list that is obtained after B is appended to A.
3. Weighted coalitional manipulation
We begin our contribution by presenting a general greedy algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem. Some of
our main results concern this algorithm or its restriction to scoring rules.
The greedy algorithm is given as Algorithm 1. It works as follows: the manipulators, according to descending weights,
each rank p ﬁrst and rank the other candidates in a way that minimizes their maximum score. This algorithm is a general-
ization of the one that appeared in Bartholdi et al. [3].
Deﬁnition 3.1. We refer to an iteration of the main for loop in lines 4–12 of the algorithm as a stage of the algorithm.
We will use the fact that for many voting rules, if there exists a manipulation for a coalition of manipulators with weight
list W , then there exists a manipulation for a coalition of manipulators with weight list W ′ where W ′ ⊇ W . Normally, if
the coalition is too small then there is no manipulation, and this is indeed what the algorithm will report. On the other
hand, if the coalition is large enough, then the greedy algorithm will ﬁnd the manipulation. So there remains a window of
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weights for voters in T , |W | = |T | = n
2: sort(W ) Sort the weights in descending order
3: X ← ∅ Will contain the preferences of T
4: for j = 1, . . . ,n do Iterate over voters by descending weights
5: P j ← (p) Put p at the ﬁrst place of the jth preference list
6: for t = 2, . . . ,m do Iterate over places of jth preference list
7: Evaluate the score of each candidate if j would put it at the next available place
8: Pick c ∈ argminc∈C\P j {Score of c from XS ∪ X ∪ {P j + {c}}}
9: P j = P j + {c} Add c to j’s preference list
10: end for
11: X ← X ∪ {P j}
12: end for
13: XT ← X
14: if argmaxc∈C {Score of c based on XS ∪ XT } = {p} then
15: return true p wins
16: else
17: return false
18: end if
19: end procedure
Algorithm 1. Decides CCWM.
1: procedure Scoring-rules-Greedy(C, p, σ0(C),W ) σ0(C) is the list of scores of candidates
distributed by voters in S , W is the list of weights for voters in T , |W | = |T | = n
2: for j = 1, . . . ,n do Go over voters in T
3: σ j(p) = σ j−1(p) + w jα1 Put p at the ﬁrst place of the jth preference list
4: Let t1, t2, . . . , tm−1 s.t. ∀l, σ j−1(ctl−1 ) σ j−1(ctl )
5: j votes p  ct1  · · ·  ctm−1
6: for l = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do Update the scores
7: σ j(ctl ) = σ j−1(ctl ) + w jαl+1
8: end for
9: end for
10: if argmaxc∈C {σn(c)} = {p} then p wins
11: return true
12: else
13: return false
14: end if
15: end procedure
Algorithm 2. Decides CCWM in Scoring rules.
error, where for some coalitions there could exist a manipulation, but the algorithm may not ﬁnd it. We are interested in
bounding the size of this window. We ﬁrst formulate the monotonicity property described above.
Deﬁnition 3.2. In the context of the CCWM problem, a voting rule is said to be monotone in weights if it satisﬁes the
following property: whenever there is a manipulation making p win for manipulator set T with weight list W , there is also
a manipulation making p win for manipulator set T ′ with weight list W ′ , where T ′ ⊇ T , W ′ ⊇ W .
Monotonicity in weights is a prerequisite for the type of analysis we wish to present. However, surprisingly, not all
the basic voting rules have this property; in particular, the prominent Copeland rule does not possess it. We show this by
example in Appendix A.
3.1. Borda
In this subsection, we analyze the performance of Algorithm 1 with respect to the Borda voting rule. Note that, in the
context of scoring rules, Algorithm 1 reduces to Algorithm 2. This algorithm ﬁrst appeared in Procaccia and Rosenschein [24].
In this speciﬁc instantiation of Algorithm 1, we do not require sorting of the manipulator weights, as this does not play a
part in our analysis.
Lemma 3.3. Scoring rules are monotone in weights.
Proof. Let C be the candidate set; p ∈ C is the preferred candidate, S is the set of truthful voters, and W are the weights
for the manipulators T . Denote |C | = m, |S| = N, |W | = |T | = n. It is enough to show that if there is a manipulation for
the set T , then for the same instance with manipulators T ′ = T + {v} with weight list W ′ = W + {w}, where w  1 is an
integer, there is also a manipulation, and the rest will follow by induction.
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preference orders of voters in T that make p win. Fix some order on the voters in T . By deﬁnition, for all c ∈ C \{p}, σn(c) <
σn(p). Let the additional voter of T ′ rank p at the ﬁrst place, and report some arbitrary order on the other candidates. Then
for all c ∈ C \ {p}, σn+1(p) = σn(p) + wα1 > σn(c) + wα1  σn+1(c). Hence, p wins. 
We are now ready to present our theorem regarding the Borda rule.
Theorem 3.4. In the CCWM problem under Borda, let C be a set of candidates with p ∈ C a preferred candidate, S a set of voters who
already cast their votes. Let W be the weight list for the set T . Then:
1. If there is no ballot making p win the election, then Algorithm 2 will return false.
2. If there exists a ballot making p win the election, then for the same instance with weight list W + {w ′1, . . . ,w ′k}, where k  1,∑k
i=1 w ′i max(W ), Algorithm 2 will return true.
Before we proceed to the theorem’s proof, a short discussion is in order. Despite its mathematical formulation, one should
not think of Item 2 of the theorem as saying that if the algorithm fails on one instance, it would succeed on another. Rather,
the theorem implies that the algorithm succeeds on any given instance such that there is a “smaller” instance (where the
manipulators have less weight) on which success is possible. Here the monotonicity in weights property comes into play.
Also note that Item 1 of the theorem is true for any constructive algorithm; this item (which also appears in our subsequent
theorems) is trivially satisﬁed.
Another interesting point is that this theorem can be viewed as implying that Algorithm 2 gives some sort of additive
approximation ratio. Formally, it seems unnatural to adopt the notion of approximation algorithms in the context of the
CCWM problem. However, the exact way in which the theorem yields approximation guarantees will become apparent
when we discuss the unweighted setting, in Section 4.
A key notion for the proof of the theorem is the deﬁnition of the set GW . Let W be list of weights; we de-
ﬁne GW as follows. Run the algorithm n + 1 stages with the weights W + {w}, where w is an arbitrary weight.
Let G0W = argmaxg∈C\{p}{σ0(g)}, and, by induction, for s = 1,2, . . . : GsW = Gs−1W ∪ {g | g was ranked below some g′ ∈
Gs−1W in some stage l,1 l n+ 1}. Finally, let GW =
⋃
0s G
s
W .
Informally, GW is constructed by taking candidates that initially have maximum score, and then inductively adding
candidates that are ranked by the algorithm below candidates that were already added to the set. Since the algorithm
ranks stronger candidates below weaker candidates, only strong candidates are ultimately members of GW . The additional
arbitrary weight w , and the existence of stage n+ 1 (when there are in fact only n manipulators with weights W ) are just
a formality: we are also interested in the way the algorithm would rank the candidates after all the manipulators have cast
their ballots, but we do not care about their scores after this ﬁnal “virtual” ranking.
Observe that the indices s = 1, . . . are not directly related to stages l = 1, . . . ,n: a candidate c is added to GsW if he is
ranked below a candidate c′ ∈ Gs−1W in some stage l = 1, . . . ,n (e.g., not necessarily in stage s).
Notice that the above deﬁnition is independent of the weight w , as this weight is used only in stage n + 1, so it does
not impact the preferences of the voters, and thus it does not impact GW . From the deﬁnition, G0W ⊆ G1W ⊆ · · · ⊆ C \ {p}.
Furthermore, as |C \ {p}| =m− 1, it follows that there exists 0 s′ m− 2 s.t. Gs′W = Gs
′+1
W , and thus GW = Gs
′
W = Gm−2W .
We are now ready to unfold the proof of Theorem 3.4. The proof relies on Lemmata 3.5–3.13. The general intuition of the
proof is as follows. Consider the candidates in GW ; we show that if there exists a manipulation, it must be possible to get
the score of p to be higher than their average score. The diﬃcult part is to show that the average score of the candidates in
GW is relatively close to the maximal ﬁnal score. As a result, a few additional manipulators are suﬃcient to push p above
the maximal score as well.
In the ﬁrst three lemmata, Lemmata 3.5–3.7, we show that the candidates in GW are the ones with highest scores and
we give a connection between their average score and the success of the algorithm in ﬁnding a manipulation. The next
straightforward lemma formalizes the intuition that the strong candidates in GW are always ranked last by the algorithm.
Lemma 3.5. Given W , the candidates in GW were ranked at each stage l,1 l  n+ 1 at the |GW | last places, i.e., they were always
granted the points |GW | − 1, . . . ,0.
Proof. If, by way of contradiction, there exists c ∈ C \ GW that was ranked in some stage in one of the last |GW | places,
then there is g ∈ GW that was ranked above c at this stage. Let s  0 such that g ∈ GsW . By deﬁnition, c ∈ Gs+1W ⇒ c ∈ GW ,
a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.6, directly building on Lemma 3.5, states that when the algorithm terminates, the candidates in GW have scores
that are higher than any candidate outside the set, perhaps except p.
Lemma 3.6. For all c ∈ C \ (GW ∪ {p}), it holds that σn(c)ming∈GW {σn(g)}.
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would have been ranked below g . Let s 0 s.t. g ∈ GsW . Then c ∈ Gs+1W ⇒ c ∈ GW , a contradiction. 
The next lemma clariﬁes the connection between the deﬁnition of GW and Theorem 3.4. Indeed, it links the average
score of the candidates in GW (when the algorithm terminates) and the answer returned by the algorithm.
Lemma 3.7. Given W , |W | = n, let GW be as before. Denote by q(W ) the average score of candidates in GW after n stages: q(W ) =
1
|GW |
∑
g∈GW σn(g). Then:
1. If σn(p) q(W ) then there is no manipulation that makes p win the election, and the algorithm will return false.
2. If σn(p) >maxg∈GW {σn(g)}, then there is a manipulation that makes p win, and the algorithm will ﬁnd it.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove part 1. Denote W = {w1, . . . ,wn}. We have the set GW , and we suppose that σn(p)  q(W ). Let us
consider a ballot XT of votes in T , and let σ ′n(c) be the scores of the candidates c ∈ C implied by this ballot (including all
the votes in S). Since in Algorithm 2 p was placed at the top of the preference of each voter in T , we have that:
σn(p) = σ0(p) +
n∑
j=1
w j(m− 1) σ ′n(p). (1)
On the other hand, since by Lemma 3.5, in Algorithm 2 the candidates of GW were ranked by all the voters in T in the last
|GW | places, it follows that
q(W ) = 1|GW |
( ∑
g∈GW
σ0(g) +
n∑
j=1
w j
|GW |−1∑
i=0
i
)
 1|GW |
∑
g∈GW
σ ′n(g) =: q′(XT ). (2)
Combining together (1) and (2) we get that σ ′n(p)  q′(XT ). There is at least one g ∈ GW such that σ ′n(g)  q′(XT ) (since
q′(XT ) is the average of the scores), hence σ ′n(p) σ ′n(g), and so p will not win when XT is applied.
Also note that Algorithm 2 returns true only if it constructs a (valid) ballot that makes p win, and so for the case
σn(p) q(W ) the algorithm will return false.
We now prove part 2 of the lemma. If σn(p) > maxg∈GW {σn(g)}, then by Lemma 3.6 for all c ∈ C \ {p}, σn(p) > σn(c),
and so the algorithm will ﬁnd the manipulation. 
Lemma 3.8 is independent of the lemmata before and after it, but is used directly in the proof of Theorem 3.4. It
gives a connection between the average score of the candidates in GW+{w} and GW , where w is the weight of some
additional manipulator. In other words, it bounds the effect that adding a manipulator has on the average score of the
strong candidates.
Lemma 3.8. Let GW ,q(W ) be as before. Then for w  1, q(W + {w}) − q(W ) wm−22 .
Proof. First, GW ⊆ GW+{w} , because for all s  0,GsW ⊆ GsW+{w} . Now, for all g ∈ GW+{w} \ GW , g was not ranked in the
ﬁrst n+ 1 stages after any candidate in GW , and so for all g′ ∈ GW , σn(g) σn(g′), and hence
1
|GW+{w}|
∑
g∈GW+{w}
σn(g)
1
|GW |
∑
g′∈GW
σn(g
′) = q(W ).
Now we can proceed:
q
(
W + {w})= 1|GW+{w}|
∑
g∈GW+{w}
σn+1(g)
= 1|GW+{w}|
∑
g∈GW+{w}
σn(g) + w|GW+{w}|
|GW+{w}|−1∑
i=0
i
 q(W ) + w
m− 1
m−2∑
i=0
i
= q(W ) + wm− 2
2
.
And so, q(W + {w}) − q(W ) wm−2 . 2
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max(W )m−22 . This fact is stated in Lemma 3.13, which is the only one directly used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
First we need to show that the scores of candidates in GW are concentrated, in a sense. This is intuitive, since the
algorithm doesn’t allow the score of any candidate in GW to “escape” by ranking it close to the bottom if its score becomes
too high in some stage. We will require the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.9. For an integer w  0, a ﬁnite non-empty set of integers A is called w-dense if when we sort the set in
nonincreasing order b1  b2  · · · bk (such that {b1, . . . ,bk} = A), it holds that for all 1 j  k− 1, b j+1  b j − w .
So, formally, we want to show (Lemma 3.12) that σn(GW ) is wmax-dense, where wmax = maxW . This will be accom-
plished via a number of technical steps.
Lemma 3.10. Let W be a list of weights, |W | = n. Let GW =⋃0s GsW , as before. Then for all s  1 and g ∈ GsW \ Gs−1W there exist
g′ ∈ Gs−1W , X ⊆ C \ {p} (perhaps X = ∅) and j, 0 j  n, s.t. {σ j(g),σ j(g′)} ∪ σ j(X) is wmax-dense, where wmax =max(W ).
Proof. Let s  1 and g ∈ GsW \ Gs−1W . By deﬁnition, there exist g′ ∈ Gs−1W and a minimal j, 1  j  n + 1, such that g was
ranked below g′ in stage j. We distinguish between two cases:
Case 1: j > 1. In this case g was ranked above g′ in stage j − 1. So we have:
σ j−1(g) σ j−1(g′), (3)
σ j−2(g) σ j−2(g′). (4)
Denote αd(h) := m− (place of h ∈ C at the preference list of voter d). Further, denote by wd the weight of voter d
(so in stage d, h gets wdαd(h) points). g was ranked above g′ in stage j − 1, and hence α j−1(g) > α j−1(g′). Denote
l = α j−1(g) − α j−1(g′), and w := w j−1. Let g′ = g0, g1, . . . , gl = g be the candidates that got in stage j − 1 the points
wα j−1(g′),w(α j−1(g′) + 1), . . . ,w(α j−1(g′) + l), respectively. Our purpose is to show that {σ j−1(g0), . . . , σ j−1(gl)} is w-
dense, and therefore wmax-dense. By deﬁnition of the algorithm,
σ j−2(g0) σ j−2(g1) · · · σ j−2(gl). (5)
Denote ut = σ j−2(gt) + wα j−1(g′) for 0 t  l. Then
∀t, 0 t  l, σ j−1(gt) = ut + wt. (6)
So we need to show that {ut + wt | 0 t  l} is w-dense. It is enough to show that:
(a) For all t , 0 t  l, if ut + wt < u0, then there exists t′ , t < t′  l, s.t. ut + wt < ut′ + wt′  ut + w(t + 1), and
(b) For all t , 0 t  l, if ut + wt > u0, then there exists t′ , 0 t′ < t , s.t. ut + w(t − 1) ut′ + wt′ < ut + wt .
Proof of (a): From (5) we get
u0  · · · ul. (7)
Also from (3) and (6) we have u0  ul + wl. Let 0 t  l− 1 s.t. ut + wt < u0. Let us consider the sequence ut + wt,ut+1 +
w(t+1), . . . ,ul+wl. Since ut +wt < u0  ul+wl, it follows that there is a minimal index t′, t < t′  l s.t. ut +wt < ut′ +wt′ .
Then ut′−1 + w(t′ − 1) ut + wt , and thus
ut′−1 + wt′  ut + w(t + 1). (8)
From (7) ut′  ut′−1, and then
ut′ + wt′  ut′−1 + wt′. (9)
Combining (8) and (9) together, we get ut′ + wt′  ut + w(t + 1). This concludes the proof of (a). The proof of (b) is
analogous, by choosing t′ to be the maximal index such that ut′ + wt′ < ut + wt .
Case 2: j = 1. We proceed by essentially reducing this case to Case 1. In Case 2 we have that s 2, because otherwise, if
s = 1, then g′ ∈ G0W ; therefore σ0(g) σ0(g′) =maxh∈C\{p}{σ0(h)} ⇒ g ∈ G0W , a contradiction. g′ /∈ Gs−2W , because otherwise,
by deﬁnition, g ∈ Gs−1W . Therefore there exists g′′ ∈ Gs−2W s.t. g′ was ranked below g′′ in some stage j′ , i.e., σ j′−1(g′) 
σ j′−1(g′′). g has never been ranked below g′′ (because otherwise g ∈ Gs−1W ), and it follows that σ j′−1(g)  σ j′−1(g′′). By
combining the last arguments, we get that σ j′−1(g) σ j′−1(g′).
Let j0 be minimal s.t. σ j0 (g) σ j0 (g′). As in stage 1g was ranked below g′ , it holds that σ0(g) σ0(g′). If j0 = 0 then
σ0(g) = σ0(g′), hence {σ0(g),σ0(g′)} is 0-dense, and in particular wmax-dense.
Otherwise ( j0 = 0) it holds that σ j0−1(g) > σ j0−1(g′) by the minimality of j0. So, we have that
σ j0 (g
′) σ j0 (g),
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σ j0−1(g′) σ j0−1(g).
These two inequalities are analogous to (3) and (4), with j − 1 replaced by j0, and the roles of g and g′ exchanged. From
this point we can proceed exactly as in Case 1, keeping in mind these cosmetic changes. 
The following lemma asserts that a dense set of the scores of candidates in stage j can be replaced by a dense set of
ﬁnal scores by considering a possibly larger set of candidates.
Lemma 3.11. Let W be a list of weights, |W | = n, wmax = max(W ). Let H ⊆ C \ {p} s.t. σ j(H) is wmax-dense for some 0 j  n.
Then there exists H ′, H ⊆ H ′ ⊆ C \ {p} s.t. σn(H ′) is wmax-dense.
Proof. We have H ⊆ C \ {p} and 0  j  n, s.t. σ j(H) is wmax-dense. Denote H j := H . Deﬁne inductively for t = j, j +
1, . . . ,n − 1: Ht+1 = {g ∈ C \ {p} | minh∈Ht {σt(h)}  σt(g)  maxh∈Ht {σt(h)}}. Of course, for all t , Ht ⊆ Ht+1. It is easy to
see that if for some j  t  n − 1, σt(Ht) is wmax-dense, then σt+1(Ht+1) is also wmax-dense. So, we get by induction that
σn(Hn) is wmax-dense, and H ⊆ Hn ⊆ C \ {p}. 
Lemma 3.12. Let W be a list of weights, |W | = n, wmax =max(W ). Let GW be as before. Then the set σn(GW ) is wmax-dense.
Proof. Let g = g0 ∈ GW . If g /∈ G0W , then g ∈ GsW \ Gs−1W for some s  1. By Lemma 3.10 there exist g1 ∈ Gs−1W and X1 ⊆
C \ {p} s.t. {σ j(g0),σ j(g1)} ∪ σ j(X1) is wmax-dense for some 0 j  n. By Lemma 3.11 there exists X ′1, X1 ⊆ X ′1 ⊆ C \ {p},
s.t. {σn(g0),σn(g1)} ∪ σn(X ′1) is wmax-dense. Denote Z1 := {g0, g1} ∪ X ′1. Similarly, if g1 /∈ G0W , then there exist g2 ∈ Gs−2W
and X ′2 s.t. {σn(g1),σn(g2)} ∪ σn(X ′2) is wmax-dense. Denote Z2 := {g1, g2} ∪ X ′2, etc. Thus, we can build a sequence of
sets Z1, . . . , Zs+1, s.t. for all 1 t  s + 1, σn(Zt) is wmax-dense, g = g0 ∈ Z1 and for each 1 t  s there exists gt ∈ Gs−tW
s.t. gt ∈ Zt ∩ Zt+1, and in particular, gs ∈ G0W .
It is easy to see that for two w-dense sets A, A′ , if A ∩ A′ = ∅ then A ∪ A′ is also w-dense, and hence we get Zg :=⋃s+1
t=1 Zt is wmax-dense. Note that σ0(G0W ) is wmax-dense, and hence there exists Zˆ ,G0W ⊆ Zˆ ⊆ C \ {p} s.t. σn( Zˆ) is wmax-
dense. Hence, σn(Zg ∪ Zˆ) is wmax-dense.
The sets Zg ∪ Zˆ , for all g ∈ GW , all intersect in Zˆ , and their union is Zˆ ∪ ⋃g∈GW Zg . We deduce that {σn(g) | g ∈
Zˆ ∪⋃g∈GW Zg} is wmax-dense. By Lemma 3.6, for all h ∈ Zˆ ∪⋃g∈GW Zg , if h /∈ GW , then σn(h)  ming∈GW {σn(g)}, and
hence σn(GW ) is a also wmax-dense. 
Lemma 3.13. Let W be a list of weights, |W | = n, wmax =max(W ). Let GW be as before, and denote q(W ) = 1|GW |
∑
g∈GW σn(g), as
before. Then maxg∈GW {σn(g)} − q(W ) wmaxm−22 .
Proof. Sort the members of GW by their scores after the nth stage, i.e., GW = {g1, . . . , g|GW |} s.t. for all 1 t  |GW | − 1,
σn(gt)  σn(gt+1). Denote for 1  t  |GW |, ut = σn(g1) − wmax(t − 1), and let U = {u1, . . . ,u|GW |}. |U | = |GW |, maxU =
σn(g1) = maxg∈GW {σn(g)}. By Lemma 3.12, it is easy to see that for all 1  t  |GW |, σn(gt)  ut . Consequently, q(W ) 
1
|GW |
∑|GW |
t=1 ut , hence
max
g∈GW
{
σn(g)
}− q(W ) = u1 − q(W ) u1 − 1|GW |
|GW |∑
t=1
ut = wmax |GW | − 1
2
 wmax
m− 2
2
. 
We are ﬁnally ready to prove Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Regarding part 1, Algorithm 2 returns true only if it constructs a (valid) ballot that makes p win, and
thus if there is no ballot making p win, Algorithm 2 will return false.
We now prove part 2 of the theorem. Suppose that there exists a ballot making p win for weight list W , |W | = n. Let
W ′ := W +{w ′1, . . . ,w ′k} for k 1,
∑k
i=1 w ′i max(W ). By Lemma 3.7, σn(p) > q(W ). From Lemma 3.8 we get by induction
that
q(W ′) q(W ) +
k∑
i=1
w ′i ·
m− 2
2
. (10)
By Lemma 3.13 and (10) we get:
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g∈GW ′
{
σn+k(g)
}
 q(W ′) +max(W ′) · m− 2
2
 q(W ′) +
k∑
i=1
w ′i ·
m− 2
2
 q(W ) +
k∑
i=1
w ′i · (m− 2)
< σn(p) +
k∑
i=1
w ′i · (m− 1) = σn+k(p)
and hence, by Lemma 3.7 the algorithm will ﬁnd a ballot making p win for set T ′ with weights W ′ , and will return true.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4. 
The following is an example where there is a manipulation for weight list W , but Algorithm 2 will ﬁnd a manipulation
only for weight list W + {w ′}.
Example 3.14. In our example W = {1,1,1,1}, w ′ = 1, so we are actually talking about the special case of unweighted
coalitions. Consider the set C = {p,1,2,3,4,5,6},m = |C | = 7,N = |S| = 5. 3 voters in S voted 6  5  4  3  2  p  1,
and the other 2 voters in S voted 2  3  4  5  6  p  1. When applying Algorithm 2 to this input, the voters in T will
award the candidates with the following scores (we denote by α j(c) the points that voter j gives to candidate c):4
Candidate c ∈ C p 1 2 3 4 5 6
σ0(c) 5 0 18 19 20 21 22
α1(c) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
α2(c) 6 5 0 1 2 3 4
α3(c) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
α4(c) 6 5 0 1 2 3 4
α5(c) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
So the cumulative scores will be as follows:
Candidate c ∈ C p 1 2 3 4 5 6
σ0(c) 5 0 18 19 20 21 22
σ1(c) 11 5 22 22 22 22 22
σ2(c) 17 10 22 23 24 25 26
σ3(c) 23 15 26 26 26 26 26
σ4(c) 29 20 26 27 28 29 30
σ5(c) 35 25 30 30 30 30 30
Note that after 4 stages, the algorithm still did not ﬁnd a manipulation: σ4(p) = 29< 30= σ4(6). However, if we change
the votes of the third and fourth voters of T , then we ﬁnd an appropriate ballot:
Candidate c ∈ C p 1 2 3 4 5 6
σ0(c) 5 0 18 19 20 21 22
α1(c) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
α2(c) 6 5 0 1 2 3 4
α′3(c) 6 5 3 4 0 1 2
α′4(c) 6 5 3 1 4 2 0
Now the cumulative scores are:
4 We assumed here that when two candidates have the same scores up until a certain stage, the current voter will award fewer points to the candidate
with lower index, but any tie-breaking rule will give the same results.
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σ0(c) 5 0 18 19 20 21 22
σ1(c) 11 5 22 22 22 22 22
σ2(c) 17 10 22 23 24 25 26
σ ′3(c) 23 15 25 27 24 26 28
σ ′4(c) 29 20 28 28 28 28 28
Evidently, for any c ∈ C \ {p}, σ ′4(p) = 29> σ ′4(c).
3.2. Maximin
In this subsection, we show that Algorithm 1 also does well with respect to the Maximin rule.
Lemma 3.15.Maximin is monotone in weights.
Proof. Let XS be the preference orders of the voters in S , and let XT be the preference orders of the voters in T that
make p win. We need to show that there are preference orders for T ′ = T + {v} with weight list W ′ = W + {w} where
w  1 is an integer, that make p win. Fix some order on voters in T . By deﬁnition, for all c ∈ C \ {p}, σn(c) < σn(p). Let
the additional voter of T ′ vote with p at the ﬁrst place, and some arbitrary order on the other candidates. Then for all
c ∈ C \ {p}, σn+1(p) = σn(p) + w > σn(c) + w  σn+1(c), and so we got the ballot of votes of T ′ to make p win. 
Theorem 3.16. In CCWM under Maximin, let C be the set of candidates with p ∈ C the preferred candidate, and S the set of voters who
already cast their votes. Let W be the weight list for the set T . Then:
1. If there is no ballot making p win the election, then Algorithm 1 will return false.
2. If there is a ballot making p win the election, then for the same instance with weight list W ′ s.t. W ′ ⊇ W + W (i.e., W ′ contains
two copies of W ), Algorithm 1 will return true.
Let us introduce some more notation. For candidates g, g′ ∈ C and 0 j  n we denote by N j(g, g′) the total weight of
the voters after j stages (including the voters in S) that prefer g over g′ . So σ j(g) = ming′∈C\{g} N j(g, g′). We also denote
for g ∈ C , 0 j  n:
MIN j(g) =
{
h ∈ C \ {g} | N j(g,h) = σ j(g)
}
.
In words, MIN j(g) is the set of candidates that constitute the worst opponents of g in pairwise elections at stage j. Put
differently, these are the candidates whose competition against g deﬁnes the Maximin score of g at stage j.
Fixing the set C , p ∈ C , and an order on the weight list W , we denote by f ( j) the maximal score of p’s opponents
distributed by Algorithm 1 after j stages:
f ( j) = max
g∈C\{p}σ j(g).
In Algorithm 1, p is always placed at the top of each preference, and so with each voter its score grows by the weight
of this voter. In our next lemma we will put forward an upper bound on the growth rate of the scores of p’s opponents.
Lemma 3.17. Consider Algorithm 1 applied to the Maximin rule. Denote by w j the weight of the jth voter processed by the algorithm.
Then for all 0 j  n− 2, f ( j + 2) f ( j) +max{w j+1,w j+2}.
To intuitively see why the lemma implies Theorem 3.16, notice that if there are two copies of W , the score of p would
increase by 2 ·∑w∈W w , whereas by the lemma the score of the strongest candidate would increase by at most ∑w∈W w .
We now prove the lemma; the theorem will follow easily.
Proof. Let 0  j  n − 2. Let g = p be a candidate. By deﬁnition σ j(g)  f ( j). We would like to show that σ j+2(g) 
f ( j) + max{w j+1,w j+2}. If σ j+1(g) f ( j), then σ j+2(g) σ j+1(g) + w j+2  f ( j) + max{w j+1,w j+2}, and we are done.
So let us assume now that σ j+1(g) > f ( j).
Deﬁne a directed graph G = (V , E), where
V = {g} ∪ {x ∈ C \ {p} | x was ranked below g in stage j + 1},
and (x, y) ∈ E iff y ∈MIN j(x). There is at least one outgoing edge from g in E , since otherwise there was g′ ∈MIN j(g) that
voter j + 1 ranked above g , and then σ j+1(g) = σ j(g) f ( j), a contradiction.
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In addition, we claim that for all x ∈ V \ {g} there is at least one outgoing edge from x in E . Indeed, otherwise there is
x′ ∈MIN j(x) that was ranked above g in stage j + 1. Hence, we have that
σ j+1(x) = σ j(x) f ( j) < σ j+1(g).
This implies that Algorithm 1 should have ranked x above g in stage j + 1, which is a contradiction to the fact that
x ∈ V \ {g}.
For x ∈ V , denote by V (x) all the vertices y in V such that there exists a directed path from x to y. Denote by G(x) the
sub-graph of G induced by V (x). It is easy to see that G(g) contains at least one cycle. Let U be one such cycle. Let g′ ∈ U
be the vertex that was ranked highest among the vertices of U in stage j + 1. Let g′′ be the vertex before g′ in the cycle:
(g′′, g′) ∈ U . Since g′′ was ranked below g′ at stage j + 1, it follows that σ j+1(g′′) = σ j(g′′) f ( j).
Suppose, for contradiction, that σ j+2(g) > f ( j) + max{w j+1,w j+2}. g was ranked by j + 2 at place t∗ . Then g′′ was
ranked by j + 2 above t∗ , since otherwise when we had reached the place t∗ , we would pick g′′ (with score σ j+2(g′′) 
f ( j) + w j+2 < σ j+2(g)) instead of g—a contradiction.
Denote by X1 all the vertices in V (g) that have an outgoing edge to g′′ in G(g). For all x ∈ X1, g′′ ∈ MIN j(x), i.e.,
σ j(x) = N j(x, g′′). All x ∈ X1 were ranked by j+ 2 above g , since otherwise, if there was x ∈ X1, s.t. until the place t∗ it still
was not added to the preference list, then when evaluating its score on place t∗ , we would get: σ j+2(x)  N j+2(x, g′′) =
N j+1(x, g′′) N j(x, g′′) + w j+1 = σ j(x) + w j+1 < σ j+2(g), and so we would put x instead of g .
Denote by X2 all the vertices in V (g) that have an outgoing edge to some vertex x ∈ X1. In the same manner we can
show that all the vertices in X2 were ranked in stage j + 2 above g . We continue in this manner, by deﬁning sets X3, . . . ,
where the set Xl contains all vertices in V (g) that have an outgoing edge to some vertex in Xl−1; the argument above
shows that all elements of these sets are ranked above g in stage j + 2. As there is a path from g to g′′ in G(g), we will
eventually reach g in this way, i.e., there is some l such that Xl contains a vertex g0 with an edge from g to g0 (see Fig. 1).
Thus,
σ j+2(g) N j+2(g, g0) = N j+1(g, g0) N j(g, g0) + w j+1
= σ j(g) + w j+1  f ( j) +max{w j+1,w j+2}
< σ j+2(g),
a contradiction. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.16.
Proof. We prove part 1. Algorithm 1 returns true only if it constructs a (valid) ballot that makes p win, and thus if there is
no ballot making p win, Algorithm 1 will return false.
We now prove part 2. Suppose that there exists a ballot ZT making p win for weight list W = {w1, . . . ,wn}. Let σ ′j(g)
be the scores implied by ZT . Then:
f (0) < σ ′n(p) σ0(p) +
n∑
i=1
wi . (11)
Let W ′ = W + W + X , where X is some list of weights (possibly empty). We need to show that σ|W ′ |(p) > f (|W ′|). In
Algorithm 1, after sorting the weights of W ′ , the equal weights of two copies of W will be adjacent, i.e., the order of
weights in W ′ will be of the form:
x1, . . . , xq1 ,w1,w1, xq1+1, . . . , xq2 ,w2,w2, . . . ,wn,wn, xqn+1, . . . , x|X |.
By Lemma 3.17, one can prove by induction that:
f
(|W ′|) f (0) + |X |∑ xi + n∑wi . (12)i=1 i=1
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σ|W ′|(p) = σ0(p) +
|X |∑
i=1
xi + 2
n∑
i=1
wi > f (0) +
|X |∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=1
wi  f
(|W ′|). 
In Appendix B we give a simple algorithm, which is tailor-made for Maximin, and also enjoys the implications of The-
orem 3.16. However, this algorithm does not extend to other voting rules, as Algorithm 1 does. Moreover, we believe that
Algorithm 1 does better when it comes to unweighted manipulation (see Sections 4 and 6).
3.3. Plurality with runoff
In this subsection we present a heuristic algorithm for the CCWM problem in Plurality with Runoff. The algorithm
receives as a parameter a size of window 0 u max(W ) where it can give a wrong answer. Its running time depends on
the size of its input and on u (see below). We begin by noting:
Lemma 3.18. Plurality with Runoff is monotone in weights.
Proof. Let C be the candidates, p ∈ C is the preferred candidate, S is the set of truthful voters, and W are the weights for
manipulators of T . Suppose that there is a ballot of votes of T that makes p win the election. We need to show that there
is a ballot making p win for the set W ′ = W + {w}, where w  1. Let g be the candidate that proceeds with p to the
second round in the winning ballot for W . Let the additional voter vote p  . . . . Then the plurality score of p and g will not
decrease, while the plurality score of any other candidate will remain the same, and so p and g will proceed to the next
round in the new ballot as well. In the second round p will beat g in the new ballot, since the total weight of the voters
who prefer p to g increased, while the total weight of voters who prefer g to p remained the same. Thus, p will win the
election in the new ballot. 
We will now give an informal description of the algorithm. We go over all the candidates other than p. To each candidate
g we try to assign the voters with minimal total weight, such that if these voters place g ﬁrst, g continues to the second
round; the rest of the voters rank p ﬁrst. If we succeeded in this way to make g and p survive the ﬁrst round, and in the
second round p beats g , then we found a valid ballot for making p win the election. If no candidate g was found in this
way, then we report that there is no ballot.
A formal description of this algorithm, Algorithm 3, is given below. The following additional notations are required.
Denote by βX (g) the plurality score of g from voter set X (i.e., the sum of weights of the voters in X that put g at the top
of their preferences). We also use NX (g, g′) =∑v∈U wv , where U is the set of all the voters in X that prefer g to g′ , and
wv is the weight of voter v . Finally, for g, g′ ∈ C we denote g  g′ if a tie between g and g′ is broken in favor of g .
Remark 3.19. In Algorithm 3 we do not rely on the assumption that for all g = p, g  p. In fact, the algorithm can deal
with any tie-breaking mechanism such that for every two distinct candidates x and y, either x  y or y  x, regardless of
how the manipulators cast their votes. An example of such a tie-breaking mechanism is to favor candidates with smaller
indices, according to some order on the candidates. This is not necessarily a reasonable way to break ties in, say, political
elections, but roughly speaking it is more general than asking that p be a unique winner, the assumption underlying our
previous results.
More precisely, Plurality with Runoff differs from Borda and Maximin in the sense that it has two different rounds, and
therefore two different “scores”. Hence, the unique winner model can be interpreted ambiguously in this context. If we
always break ties against p (the algorithm supports this), p might be tied against another candidate for the second ticket to
the second round, and lose, whereas under another interpretation p would have advanced to the second round, and would
have won the second round by a vast majority, thus becoming a unique winner.
In the next theorem we prove the correctness of Algorithm 3, and analyze its time complexity. We will see that for
getting an exact answer (u = 0), we will need running time which is polynomial in max(W ) and the rest of the input. As
the weights in W are speciﬁed in binary representation, this requires exponential time. However, when the size of the error
window increases, the complexity decreases, so for u = Ω( max(W )log(max(W )) ) the complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in its
input.
Theorem 3.20. In CCWM under Plurality with Runoff, let C be the set of candidates with p ∈ C the preferred candidate, and S be the
set of voters who already cast their votes. Let W be the weight list for the set T , and let u  0 be the error window. Then:
1. If there is no ballot making p win the election, then Algorithm 3 will return false.
2. If there is a ballot making p win the election, then for the same problem with voter set T ′ = T + {vn+1, . . . , vn+l} with weight list
W ′ = W + {wn+1, . . . ,wn+l}, where l 0,∑lj=1 wn+ j  u, Algorithm 3 will return true.
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in S , WS are the weights of voters in S , W = {w1, . . . ,wn} are the weights of voters in T , u is the
size of error window
2: for g in C \ {p} do Go over candidates in C \ {p}
3: if there exists g′ ∈ argmaxg′∈C\{p}βS (g′), g′ = g s.t. g′  g then
4: λg ←maxg′∈C\{p} βS (g′) − βS (g) + 1
5: else
6: λg ←maxg′∈C\{p} βS (g′) − βS (g)
7: end if
8: if λg >
∑n
i=1 wi then If we cannot make g pass to the next round
9: continue Go to the next candidate in the main loop
10: end if
11: x← subset-of-weights-approximate(W , λg ,u)
12: x ∈ {0,1}n minimizes {∑nj=1 w jx j |∑nj=1 w jx j  λg ,∀ j, x j ∈ {0,1}}
13: All the voters j s.t. x j = 1 vote g  . . . Order of candidates except g is arbitrary
14: All the voters j s.t. x j = 0 vote p  . . .
15: if ∃g′ ∈ C \ {p, g} s.t. (βS (g′) > βS (p) + βT (p))
16: or (βS (g′) = βS (p) + βT (p) and g′  p) then
17: continue p does not pass to next round
18: end if
19: if (NS∪T (p, g) > NS∪T (g, p)) or (NS∪T (p, g) = NS∪T (g, p) and p  g) then
20: return true p beats g in the second round
21: else
22: continue
23: end if
24: end for
25: return false No appropriate g was found
26: end procedure
27:
28: procedure subset-of-weights-approximate(W , λg ,u) W = {w1, . . . ,wn} are the weights of
voters in T , λg is the minimum total sum of desired weights, u is the size of error window
29: Check that 0 umax(W )
30: ku ←  u2n  + 1
31: Solve by dynamic prog.: max{∑nj=1 w jku x j |∑nj=1 w jx j ∑nj=1 w j − λg ,∀ j, x j ∈ {0,1}}
32: Let x ∈ {0,1}n be the vector that maximizes the above sum
33: return 1− x 1 is the vector of n 1’s
34: end procedure
Algorithm 3. Decides CCWM in Plurality with Runoff with desired accuracy.
3. On input C, p, XS ,WS ,W ,u, where |C | = m, |S| = N, |W | = n, u is an integer, s.t. 0  u  max(W ), the running time of
Algorithm 3 is polynomial in m,N, log(max(WS )),n and
max(W )
u+1 .
Proof. We start with part 1. Note that
x= (x1, . . . , xn) satisﬁes
n∑
j=1
w jx j 
n∑
j=1
w j − λg ⇐⇒ x= 1− x satisﬁes
n∑
j=1
w jx j  λg, (13)
where λg is deﬁned in Algorithm 3 as the total weight of the votes g needs in order to proceed to the second round,
and x is the binary vector of length n computed in the algorithm’s subroutine. Thus when voters corresponding to weights
returned by the function SUBSET-OF-WEIGHTS-APPROXIMATE() (see Algorithm 3) vote g  . . . , they ensure that g proceeds
to the second round. It is easy to see that whenever Algorithm 3 returns true, it actually ﬁnds a (valid) ballot making p win
the election, and so if there is no such ballot, then the algorithm will return false.
We now move on to part 2. Let AW be an instance of the problem with weight list W . Suppose that there exists ballot XT
of votes in T s.t. combined with preferences XS of voters of S , it makes p win the election in AW . We will denote by β ′Y (g)
the plurality score of g from voter set Y under the preferences XS ∪ XT . Also, we denote N ′Y (g, g′) =
∑
v∈U XS∪XT wv , where
UXS∪XT is the set of all the voters in Y that prefer g to g′ under XS ∪ XT . Let 0 u max(W ), W ′ = W +{wn+1, . . . ,wn+l},
where l 0,
∑l
j=1 wn+ j  u. We need to show that Algorithm 3 will return true on the input W ′,u.
There is a candidate g = p that passes together with p to the second round when applying the preferences XT together
with XS on AW , and thus for each candidate g′ /∈ {p, g} and c ∈ {p, g}, if c  g′ , then β ′S(c) + β ′T (c) β ′S(g′) + β ′T (g′), and
if g′  c, then β ′S (c) + β ′T (c) > β ′S(g′) + β ′T (g′). Also,
β ′T (p) + β ′T (g)
n∑
w j . (14)
j=1
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meaning that it will ﬁnd a desired ballot making p win. Otherwise, it will reach the candidate g . λg is the minimal sum of
weights that ensures that g will continue to the second round, and hence
λg  β ′T (g)
n∑
j=1
w j 
n+l∑
j=1
w j . (15)
We will reach the function SUBSET-OF-WEIGHTS-APPROXIMATE(), and enter it with arguments W ′, λg and u. By (13), the
vector x= (x1, . . . , xn+l) returned by SUBSET-OF-WEIGHTS-APPROXIMATE() satisﬁes ∑n+lj=1 w jx j  λg , and so g will continue
to the next round. Now we show that p will also continue to the next round. Denote by H the maximization problem
max
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j
s.t.
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j 
n+l∑
j=1
w j − λg (16)
x j ∈ {0,1}, for j = 1, . . . ,n+ l.
Let J∗ = { j | x j = 1, x = (x1, . . . , xn+l) is the optimal solution to H}. Denote P∗ =∑ j∈ J∗ w j . Let H(k) be the scaled version
of the above maximization problem:
max
n+l∑
j=1
w j
k
x j
s.t.
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j 
n+l∑
j=1
w j − λg (17)
x j ∈ {0,1}, for j = 1, . . . ,n+ l.
Let J (k) = { j | x j = 1, x = (x1, . . . , xn+l) is the optimal solution to H(k)}. Let P (k) = ∑ j∈ J (k) w j . Now, x = (x1, . . . , xn+l)
which we obtained in SUBSET-OF-WEIGHTS-APPROXIMATE() satisﬁes, for ku =  u2(n+l)  + 1:
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j =
∑
j∈ J (ku)
w j 
∑
j∈ J (ku)
ku
⌊
w j
ku
⌋

∑
j∈ J∗
ku
⌊
w j
ku
⌋

∑
j∈ J∗
(
w j − (ku − 1)
)
=
∑
j∈ J∗
w j − (ku − 1)| J∗| = P∗ − (ku − 1)| J∗|. (18)
Hence, the vector x= 1− x returned by the function, satisﬁes:
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j 
n+l∑
j=1
w j − P∗ + (ku − 1)| J∗|

n+l∑
j=1
w j − P∗ +
⌊
u
2(n+ l)
⌋
(n+ l) (19)

n+l∑
j=1
w j − P∗ +
⌊
u
2
⌋
.
By deﬁnition of P∗ , we get:
n+l∑
j=1
w j − P∗ =min
{
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j |
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j  λg, x j ∈ {0,1},1 j  n+ l
}
min
{
n∑
j=1
w jx j |
n∑
j=1
w jx j  λg, x j ∈ {0,1},1 j  n
}
 β ′T (g). (20)
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βT ′(g) =
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j  β ′T (g) +
⌊
u
2
⌋
. (21)
In the algorithm, all the voters j s.t. x j = 0 will vote p  . . . , and so we will have
βT ′(p) =
n+l∑
j=1
w j −
n+l∑
j=1
w jx j 
n∑
j=1
w j + u −
(
β ′T (g) +
⌊
u
2
⌋)
=
n∑
j=1
w j − β ′T (g) +
⌈
u
2
⌉
 β ′T (p) +
⌈
u
2
⌉
. (22)
For any candidate c such that c /∈ {p, g}, c was never ranked at the top of the preference lists by Algorithm 3, and so
βS∪T ′(c) = βS (c) β ′S∪T (c). On the other hand, by (22),
βS∪T ′ (p) = βS(p) + βT ′(p) βS (p) + β ′T (p) +
⌈
u
2
⌉
= β ′S∪T (p) +
⌈
u
2
⌉
 β ′S∪T (p).
Recall that p beats c in the ﬁrst round under XT . It follows that p beats c in the ﬁrst round under Algorithm 3, and so p
will continue to the next round.
We now prove that p beats g in the next round. If g  p, then in the winning ballot XT , N ′S (p, g) + N ′T (p, g) >
N ′S(g, p) + N ′T (g, p), otherwise N ′S (p, g) + N ′T (p, g) N ′S (g, p) + N ′T (g, p). From (21) we get:
NT ′(g, p) = βT ′(g) β ′T (g) +
⌊
u
2
⌋
 N ′T (g, p) +
⌊
u
2
⌋
. (23)
Thus, from (23):
NT ′(p, g) =
n+l∑
j=1
w j − NT ′(g, p)
n∑
j=1
w j + u −
(
N ′T (g, p) +
⌊
u
2
⌋)
= N ′T (p, g) +
⌈
u
2
⌉
. (24)
So, for g  p we get
N ′S(p, g) + NT ′(p, g) N ′S(p, g) + N ′T (p, g) +
⌈
u
2
⌉
> N ′S(g, p) + N ′T (g, p) +
⌊
u
2
⌋
 N ′S(g, p) + NT ′(g, p). (25)
In the same way, for p  g we get
N ′S(p, g) + NT ′(p, g) N ′S (g, p) + NT ′(g, p). (26)
Therefore, p wins the second round of the election, and hence the entire election; the algorithm will return true.
Next, we prove part 3. Using the notation of the previous part, let P (k) be the maximum sum of weights from
W = {w1, . . . ,wn}, solving the scaled maximization problem H(k).5 There is a well-known dynamic programming algo-
rithm solving the knapsack problem H(k) in time O (nP (k)) (see, e.g. [19, Chapter 9]). Furthermore, P (k) 
∑n
j=1 w jk  
nmax(W )k  nmax(W )k . The algorithm sets ku =  u2n  + 1 u+12n , and so we have:
P (ku) n
max(W )
ku
 nmax(W )
u+1
2n
= 2n2 max(W )
u + 1 . (27)
Thus we can solve H(ku) in O (nP (ku)) = O (n3 · max(W )u+1 ). It is easy to see that all the other steps of Algorithm 3 are
polynomial in its inputs; hence, the proof is completed. 
5 We slightly abuse notation here, as we deﬁned the optimization problems for weight set W ′ = {w1, . . . ,wn+l}, but the deﬁnition for the set W is
analogous.
M. Zuckerman et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 392–412 4074. Unweighted coalitional manipulation
In this section, we discuss the application of the results given above to unweighted coalitional manipulation (the CCUM
problem), and present a new theorem. We will see that some of our theorems can be translated into approximation (in the
classical sense) results in this natural setting.
It is known that the CCUM problem is tractable—with respect to any voting rule that can be computed in polynomial
time—when the number of candidates is constant [7]. However, to the best of our knowledge (at the time of submission)
there are no results regarding the complexity of the problem when the number of candidates is not constant, except for
the cases of STV and Second Order Copeland where CCUM is hard even when there is only a single manipulator [2,3]. We
conjecture that CCUM in Borda and Maximin is NP-complete.
In the context of unweighted manipulation, one can consider the following optimization problem:
Deﬁnition 4.1. In the Constructive Coalitional Unweighted Optimization (CCUO) problem, we are given the (unweighted)
votes of the truthful voters. We must ﬁnd the minimum number of manipulators needed in order to make p win (i.e., the
minimum number of manipulators that can cast their (unweighted) votes in a way that makes p win).
Then, our theorems almost directly imply the following corollary:
Corollary 4.2.
1. Algorithm 2 approximates CCUO in Borda up to an additive error of 1.
2. Algorithm 1 is a 2-approximation algorithm for CCUO in Maximin.
Proof. It is enough to show that the minimum number of manipulators needed in order to make p win, in Borda and Max-
imin, must be polynomial in the rest of the input. Indeed, in this case we can apply brute-force search using Algorithms 2
and 1, respectively, in order to approximate the answer. In other words, we run the algorithm once for every number of
manipulators k ∈ {0, . . . , p(n)} for some polynomial p. The minimum k which gives a true answer in Borda (resp., Maximin)
is guaranteed to be larger by at most 1 (resp., twice as large) than the optimal answer by Theorem 3.4 (resp., Theorem 3.16).
So, it is suﬃcient to prove the following two lemmata.
Lemma 4.3. Let 〈α1, . . . ,αm〉 be a scoring protocol where α1 − αm > 0. In the CCUO problem, let C = {c1, . . . , cm−1, p} be the
candidates, S be the set of the truthful voters, |S| = N, and n∗ be the minimal number of manipulators such that there exists a ballot
making p win. Then n∗  (N + 1)(m− 1).
Proof. We show that there exists a ballot making p win for n∗ = (N+1)(m−1). Let the manipulator 1 j  (N+1)(m−1)
vote p  · · ·  ci+1, where j−1≡ i mod(m−1), 0 i m−2, and the rest of the order is arbitrary. With every m−1 voters
the difference between the scores of any candidate c j and p decreases by at least α1 −αm . Moreover, for any 1 j m−1,
σ0(c j) σ0(p) + N(α1 − αm), and so we get: σ(N+1)(m−1)(c j) σ(N+1)(m−1)(p) − (α1 − αm) < σ(N+1)(m−1)(p). Hence, p will
win the election. 
Lemma 4.4. Consider the CCUO problem in the Maximin protocol. In the notation of Lemma 4.3, n∗  N + 1.
Proof. We show that there exists a ballot making p win for n∗ = N + 1. Let every manipulator vote p  . . . . Then for
every candidate c j we get: σN+1(c j)  NN+1(c j, p)  N . Moreover, for any candidate c j = p, NN+1(p, c j)  N + 1, and so
σN+1(p) N + 1. Hence we get for every candidate c j , σN+1(c j) < σN+1(p), implying that p will win. 
This concludes the proof of the corollary. 
On the other hand, we have the following results:
Corollary 4.5. Algorithm 3 eﬃciently solves the CCUM problem in Plurality with Runoff.
Proof. Follows as a special case of Theorem 3.20, where the error window is u = 0, the number of additional voters is l = 0,
and all the weights equal 1. 
Theorem 4.6. Algorithm 2 eﬃciently solves the CCUM problem in Veto.
A short discussion is in order regarding CCUM in Veto. Indeed, this problem can be solved eﬃciently by a trivial algo-
rithm. The fact that each manipulator can veto a single candidate may be interpreted as follows: each manipulator picks
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candidate. Thus, we simply have to count the number of manipulators needed to guarantee that p has more points than
any other candidate. Formally, if we denote by σ0(c) the score of candidate c based on the votes in S , then clearly there
exists a vote for T making p win if and only if∑
c∈C\{p}
max
(
σ0(c) − σ0(p) + 1,0
)
 |T |.
In the context of CCUM in Veto, Algorithm 2 is, in a sense, an instantiation of the simple scheme described above. However,
our direct proof of Theorem 4.6, given in Appendix C, is a simpler, but analogous, version of the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Finally, note that Corollary 4.5 and Theorem 4.6 imply that CCUO in Plurality with Runoff and Veto is also in P .
5. Relation to work on frequency of manipulation
At this point, we would like to give a more in-depth exposition of previous work regarding frequency of manipulation,
and connect it with this paper.
An interesting approach to the abovementioned issue was presented by Conitzer and Sandholm [6]. They noticed that
an election instance can be manipulated eﬃciently if it satisﬁes two properties: weak monotonicity—a property which is
satisﬁed by many prominent voting rules—and another, more arguable property: the manipulators must be able to make
one of exactly two candidates win the election. Conitzer and Sandholm empirically showed that the second property holds
with high probability in different standard voting rules. This empirical validation was carried out only with respect to small
coalitions of voters and skewed distributions over election instances.
Procaccia and Rosenschein [23] leveraged some of the intuitions provided by Conitzer and Sandholm. They analyzed the
probability of the manipulators being able to affect the outcome of the election (i.e., make one of at least two candidates
win), conditioned on the fraction of manipulators. They found that for quite general distributions over election instances,
if n = o(√N), the manipulators cannot affect the outcome with high probability; the opposite is true if n = ω(√N). These
results extended previous work on asymptotic strategy proofness [1,28].
Another result was recently presented by Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan [13]. They showed that a single manipulator can ﬁnd
a manipulation with relatively good probability by simply switching to randomly chosen linear preferences (in particular,
high probability of success can be achieved by repeating this process a polynomial number of times). This is true provided
the voting rule in question is “far from dictatorial” in some well-deﬁned sense. The proof of this theorem is beautiful, but
sadly the current proof only works for at most 3 candidates.
Most closely related to this paper is another work by Procaccia and Rosenschein [24], who have attempted to establish a
framework which would enable showing that manipulations are typically easy. For this purpose, they have deﬁned the no-
tion of junta distributions, which are intuitively (and arguably) “hard to manipulate”, over election instances in the coalitional
manipulation setting. Moreover, they have deﬁned a voting rule to be susceptible to manipulation if there is an algorithm
that decides CCWM with high probability of success, when the instances are distributed according to a junta distribution.
The rationale is that if there is an algorithm that does well with respect to these especially hard junta distributions, it would
also do well with respect to other reasonable distributions.
Procaccia and Rosenschein’s main result is that scoring rules are susceptible to manipulation, according to the foregoing
deﬁnition. Technically, Procaccia and Rosenschein’s result is in fact a very loose bound on the window of error of Algo-
rithm 2. Although their analysis holds for any scoring rule, it suffers from two major shortcomings. First, it is much looser
than the one given in this paper, and consequently does not allow for corollaries regarding unweighted coalitional manipula-
tion. In contrast, our result regarding Borda is far stronger, since the window of error is much more accurately characterized.
The stronger result allowed, e.g., for Corollary 4.2. A second major disadvantage of Procaccia and Rosenschein’s analysis is
that it only applies to a constant number of candidates, i.e., m = O (1). However, since the result in Procaccia and Rosen-
schein deals with scoring rules in general and here the only Scoring rules we deal with are Borda and Veto, neither result
strictly subsumes the other.
Erdélyi et al. [11] discuss the notion of junta distributions at length. They show that the idea of junta distributions, when
applied to the SAT problem, is not suﬃcient to classify hard-to-decide distributions. Their work is inconclusive, however,
when it comes to the application of junta distributions to hardness of manipulation problems.
Still, it seems that at this point we lack a link between a mathematical framework dealing with frequency of manipula-
tion, and hardness on average. In light of this, we shall shortly consider the intuitive frequency of manipulation implications
of our results, without being too formal. Our theorems imply that our algorithms err on only very speciﬁc conﬁgurations
of the voters’ weights. It might be productive to imagine points on the real line as representing the total weight of T . In
the case of Borda, then, our algorithm would give a correct negative answer on all points to the left of some point x, and
a correct positive answer on all points to the right of x + maxW . The range between x and x + maxW is the window of
error. This is a simpliﬁcation of the situation, but a useful one nonetheless.
Now, intuitively consider some “reasonable” distribution over the instances of the CCUM problem (such that weights
are randomly selected). The fact that the distribution is “reasonable” guarantees that the manipulators’ total weight is
distributed over a large range. Therefore, the probability of hitting the tiny window of error is extremely small. This (once
again, intuitively) means that with high probability, our algorithms would correctly decide the manipulation problem.
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We would like to devote this ﬁnal section to a short discussion regarding extensions of our results, and their applications
to other voting rules.
We have noted above (and elaborate on, in Appendix A) that Copeland’s rule is not monotone in weights. This seems
to preclude the type of analysis which we have presented here. Nevertheless, it might be possible to obtain similar results
if one endows the manipulators with the option to abstain from voting. In this way, any voting rule must be monotone
in weights, as additional manipulators can always abstain. This is also not a major departure from our model, where the
manipulators can coordinate their votes; it is only natural to assume that they can also agree not to vote at all.
The prominent Single Transferable Vote (STV) rule is one that we have not discussed above. In STV, the election proceeds
in rounds; each voter casts his vote for the candidate he ranks ﬁrst among the remaining candidates; the candidate with
lowest score is eliminated. It is diﬃcult to apply our approach to STV, for two reasons. First, it does not have a notion of
score (but this is also true for Plurality with Runoff). Second, it is a very hard voting rule to manipulate. Indeed, it is well
known that STV is hard to manipulate even for a single manipulator [2]. However, in theory STV is amenable to our type of
analysis; this remains a fascinating direction for future research.
Finally, we conjecture that our analysis of the performance of Algorithm 1 with respect to CCUM in Maximin is not tight:
it might be possible to lower the bound from 2 to 3/2 by using a close variant of the algorithm.
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Appendix A. Copeland is not monotone in weights
When discussing Scoring rules, Maximin, and Plurality with Runoff, we are motivated to look for approximate solutions
to the CCWM problem by the fact that these voting rules are monotone in weights. In contrast, Copeland is not monotone
in weights. The next example illustrates this fact. Consider the following setting: C = {p,1,2,3},N = |S| = 6. All the weights
equal 1. The votes of the voters in S are shown in the following table:
Voter in S Vote
1 p  1  2  3
2 p  2  1  3
3 3  p  1  2
4 3  p  2  1
5 1  2  3  p
6 2  1  3  p
The pairwise results are given in the next table. In the cell corresponding to the row of candidate g and the column
of candidate g′ , we write “a : b” to indicate that g is preferred to g′ by a voters, and g′ is preferred to g by b voters (i.e.,
a = N0(g, g′),b = N0(g′, g)):
p 1 2 3
p 4:2 4:2 2:4
1 2:4 3:3 4:2
2 2:4 3:3 4:2
3 4:2 2:4 2:4
From the above table we calculate that σ0(p) = 1, σ0(1) = σ0(2) = 0, σ0(3) = −1, so p wins the election in this setting.
However, if we add another voter (with weight 1), then no matter what his vote would be, p would not win the election:
if the additional voter puts 1 above 2, then 1 will win, and otherwise 2 will win.
Remark A.1. It is easy to see, however, that whenever there is a manipulation for the coalition with weights W , then there
is also a manipulation for coalition with weights W +{w}+{w}, where w  1 is an integer: the ﬁrst additional voter makes
an arbitrary vote, and the second additional voter reverses the ﬁrst’s ranking.
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Consider the following simple algorithm, which we refer to as Algorithm 4. Given the list of weights W ′ , let W =
{w1, . . . ,wk} be the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) list of weighted votes such that W ′ contains two copies of W ,
i.e., W1 + W2 ⊆ W ′ , W1 = W2 = W .6 Each manipulator in W1 votes p  c1  · · ·  cm−1, while every manipulator in W2
votes p  cm−1  · · ·  c1. The remaining manipulators all rank p ﬁrst, and the other candidates arbitrarily. The algorithm
returns true iff this ballot makes p win.
We will now easily show that Theorem 3.16 also applies to Algorithm 4.
Theorem B.1. In the Maximin rule, let C be the set of candidates with p ∈ C the preferred candidate, and S the set of voters who
already cast their votes. Let W be the weight list for the set T . Then:
1. If there is no ballot making p win the election, then Algorithm 4 will return false.
2. If there is a ballot making p win the election, then for the same instance with weight list W ′ s.t. W ′ ⊇ W + W (i.e., W ′ contains
two copies of W ), Algorithm 4 will return true.
Proof. Item 1, as always, is obvious since the algorithm is constructive. For item 2, let σ ∗(c) be candidate c’s Maximin score
based on the votes in S and the manipulator weights W which make p win. Let σ ′(c) be c’s Maximin score based on the
votes in S and the votes in W + W , according to the algorithm (notice that W ⊆ W1, W ⊆ W2). Finally, let σ(c) be c’s
score according to the algorithm, on the weight list W ′ . As before, denote W = {w1, . . . ,wk}.
First, note that σ ′(p)  σ ∗(p) +∑ki=1 wk . Moreover, clearly for any c ∈ C \ {p}, σ ′(c)  σ ∗(c) +∑ki=1 wk , as for each
c′ ∈ C \ {c, p} and each wi in the multiset W there is exactly one manipulator in W1 + W2 with weight wi which ranks c
above c′ . Since σ ∗(p) > σ ∗(c) for any c ∈ C \ {p}, we conclude that
∀c ∈ C \ {p}, σ ′(p) > σ ′(c). (28)
In order to complete the proof, we note that σ(p)−σ ′(p) σ(c)−σ ′(c) for any c ∈ C \ {p}, as all the manipulators with
weights W ′ \ (W1 + W2) rank p ﬁrst. Together with the above, we get that σ(p) > σ(c) for all c ∈ C \ {p}. 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4.6
We prove this theorem via Lemmata C.1–C.4. The proof technique is similar to that of Theorem 3.4, but the proof is
easier.
First, we deﬁne the set Xn = {x ∈ C \{p} | x was ranked last in stage j for 1 j  n}. In addition, deﬁne Yn = {y ∈ C \{p} |
σn(y)min(σn(Xn))}. From the deﬁnition, Xn ⊆ Yn . Also, by deﬁnition:
∀g /∈ Yn ∪ {p}, σn(g) <min
(
σn(Yn)
)
. (29)
We denote by α j(x) the number of points x was awarded in stage j.
Lemma C.1. For all y1, y2 ∈ Yn, |σn(y1) − σn(y2)| 1.
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ Xn s.t. σn(x∗) =min(σn(Xn)). Let y ∈ Yn . By deﬁnition, σn(x∗) σn(y). We would like to show that σn(y)
σn(x∗) + 1. Suppose for contradiction that σn(y) − σn(x∗) 2. Let 1 j  n maximal s.t. α j(x∗) = 0. Then:
σ j(y) − σ j(x∗) =
[
σn(y) −
n∑
k= j+1
αk(y)
]
−
[
σn(x
∗) −
n∑
k= j+1
αk(x
∗)
]

[
σn(y) − (n− j)
]− [σn(x∗) − (n− j)]
= σn(y) − σn(x∗) 2.
Therefore σ j−1(y) − σ j−1(x∗) 1, and so σ j−1(y) > σ j−1(x∗), a contradiction to α j(x∗) = 0. We showed that for all y ∈ Yn ,
σn(x∗) σn(y) σn(x∗) + 1, and hence for all y1, y2 ∈ Yn , |σn(y1) − σn(y2)| 1. 
Lemma C.2. Deﬁne q(n) := 1|Yn|
∑
y∈Yn σn(y). Let ZT be a preference list of voters in T , and σ
′
n(g) be the scores of g ∈ C which are
implied by ZT (including votes in S). Then q′(n) := 1|Yn|
∑
y∈Yn σ
′
n(y) q(n).
6 To simplify notation we overload W and identify it with the list of manipulators. It is straightforward that this set can be eﬃciently found. Indeed, for
each weight in the list W ′ , simply check if there is another copy, and if so, place one of them in W1 and one in W2.
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for every j, the sum
∑
y∈Yn α j(y) = |Yn| − 1 is minimal. Formally, let us denote by α′j(g) the number of points candidate g
gets from voter j in ZT . Then:
q(n) = 1|Yn|
( ∑
y∈Yn
σ0(y) + n
(|Yn| − 1)
)
 1|Yn|
( ∑
y∈Yn
σ0(y) +
n∑
j=1
∑
y∈Yn
α′j(y)
)
= 1|Yn|
∑
y∈Yn
σ ′n(y) = q′(n). 
Lemma C.3. If σn(p) >max(σn(Yn)) then Algorithm 2 will ﬁnd the manipulation that makes p win.
Proof. By Eq. (29), for all g ∈ C \ {p}, σn(g)max(σn(Yn)), and so if σn(p) >max(σn(Yn)), then for all g ∈ C \ {p}, σn(p) >
σn(g), and so the algorithm will ﬁnd the manipulation. 
Lemma C.4. If σn(p)max(σn(Yn)) then there exists no manipulation.
Proof. Let ZT be a set of preferences of voters in T , and let σ ′n(g), q′(n) and α′j(g) be as in Lemma C.2. As for all j, α j(p) =
1 α′j(p), it follows that σn(p) σ ′n(p). There is at least one g0 ∈ Yn s.t. σ ′n(g0) q′(n). By Lemma C.2, q′(n) q(n).
By Lemma C.1, q(n) =max(σn(Yn)). Combining the foregoing steps, we obtain:
σ ′n(g0)
⌈
q′(n)
⌉

⌈
q(n)
⌉=max(σn(Yn)) σn(p) σ ′n(p).
We conclude that p does not win under ZT , and hence there is no ballot of votes in T that makes p win the election. 
The proof of Theorem 4.6 is completed.
References
[1] E. Baharad, Z. Neeman, The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules, Review of Economic Design 4 (2002) 331–340.
[2] J. Bartholdi, J. Orlin, Single transferable vote resists strategic voting, Social Choice and Welfare 8 (1991) 341–354.
[3] J. Bartholdi, C.A. Tovey, M.A. Trick, The computational diﬃculty of manipulating an election, Social Choice and Welfare 6 (1989) 227–241.
[4] E.H. Clarke, Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice 11 (1971) 17–33.
[5] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard, in: Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference
on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI’03), Acapulco, Mexico, 2003, pp. 781–788.
[6] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-First National Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI’06), Boston, 2006, pp. 627–634.
[7] V. Conitzer, T. Sandholm, J. Lang, When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? Journal of the ACM 54 (3) (2007) 1–33.
[8] E. Elkind, H. Lipmaa, Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation, in: ISAAC, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 2005,
pp. 206–215.
[9] E. Elkind, H. Lipmaa, Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting, in: FC, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[10] E. Ephrati, J.S. Rosenschein, A heuristic technique for multiagent planning, Annals of Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 20 (1997) 13–67.
[11] G. Erdélyi, L.A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe, H. Spakowski, On approximating optimal weighted lobbying, and frequency of correctness versus average-case
polynomial time, in: Fundamentals of Computation Theory, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4639, Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 300–311.
[12] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L.A. Hemaspaandra, The complexity of bribery in elections, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-First National Conference
on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI 2006), Boston, 2006.
[13] E. Friedgut, G. Kalai, N. Nisan, Elections can be manipulated often, in: Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Conference on Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS’08), 2008, in press.
[14] S. Ghosh, M. Mundhe, K. Hernandez, S. Sen, Voting for movies: The anatomy of a recommender system, in: Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference
on Autonomous Agents, Seattle, 1999, p. 434–435.
[15] A. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–602.
[16] T. Groves, Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631.
[17] T. Haynes, S. Sen, N. Arora, R. Nadella, An automated meeting scheduling system that utilizes user preferences, in: Proceedings of the First Annual
Conference on Autonomous Agents, Marina del Rey, California, 1997, pp. 308–315.
[18] E. Hemaspaandra, L.A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe, Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 171 (5–6) (2007)
255–285.
[19] D.S. Hochbaum, Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems, PWS Publishing Company, 1997.
[20] H. Moulin, On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980) 437–455.
[21] K. Oﬂazer, G. Tür, Morphological disambiguation by voting constraints, in: Proceedings of the 8th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association
for Computational Linguistics (EACL 1997), 1997, pp. 222–229.
[22] D. Pennock, E. Horvitz, L. Giles, Social choice theory and recommender systems: Analysis of the axiomatic foundations of collaborative ﬁltering, in:
Proceedings of the 17th National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI 2000), 2000, pp. 729–734.
[23] A.D. Procaccia, J.S. Rosenschein, Average-case tractability of manipulation in elections via the fraction of manipulators, in: The Sixth International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2007), Honolulu, Hawaii, May 2007, pp. 718–720.
412 M. Zuckerman et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 392–412[24] A.D. Procaccia, J.S. Rosenschein, Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections, Journal of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Re-
search 28 (2007) 157–181.
[25] A.D. Procaccia, J.S. Rosenschein, A. Zohar, Multi-winner elections: Complexity of manipulation, control and winner-determination, in: The Twentieth
International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI 2007), Hyderabad, India, January 2007, pp. 1476–1481.
[26] M. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare func-
tions, Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975) 187–217.
[27] G. Sigletos, G. Paliouras, C. Spyropoulos, M. Hatzopoulos, Combining information extractions systems using voting and stacked generalization, Journal
of Machine Learning Research 6 (2006) 1751–1782.
[28] A. Slinko, How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? Mathematical Social Sciences 47 (3) (2004) 289–293.
[29] W. Vickrey, Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16 (1) (1961) 8–37.
